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l Since November 2007 the new Polish government has
achieved a re-orientation of the Polish EU policy by
pursuing an active, unprejudiced, constructive and
coalition-based approach within the EU.
l The results of this approach have been both positively
and negatively affected by external factors, such as the
economic crisis, the conflict in Georgia, and the
Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. 
l The successes of Tusk’s government include the
adoption of the Eastern Partnership initiative, the
outcome of negotiations on the new emissions trading
scheme, changing EU perceptions with regard to energy
security, and a pro-European and pro-integration
approach towards the EU policies in response to the
economic crisis.
l Questions remain as to the ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty and the adoption of the Euro, the problems with
EU unity in its relations with Russia, and the domestic
follow-up on the diplomatic achievements on the
European arena. 
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1. Re-orientation of the Polish European policy
The PO-PSL government has now been responsible for Polish foreign policyfor almost eighteen months. It came to power partly thanks to heavy criticism concerning the inadequacy of the European policy of its predecessor. From
November 2007, Polish foreign policy was to become more effective through an
open, constructive, unprejudiced and coalition-based approach. The goals of
Donald Tusk’s government were outlined in his exposé from November 2008, as
well as the Foreign Affairs Minister’s speeches in the Sejm in May 2008 and
February 2009. One year and five months is a relatively short period in European
foreign-policy making due to time-consuming negotiations and bargaining
processes. However, a re-orientation of Polish European policy in the spirit of team
playing and coalition building is evident. It is also possible to make a preliminary
assessment of Poland’s role and influence in such areas as the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), security and defence policy, climate change and
energy, enlargement, or relations with Russia. Moreover, the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty and preparations for the Polish Presidency will be discussed, as they
exert a significant impact on both European and Polish foreign policy-making. Last
but not least, while evaluating Polish weight in Europe, major external factors, such
as the economic crisis or Russia’s conflicts with its neighbours, need to be taken
into consideration.
The strategic goal of Polish foreign policy is to become a key player and a leading EU
member1. Poland wishes to achieve this aim while strengthening the community
solidarity in the EU arena and conducting wide social dialogue domestically.
Poland’s success in the EU depends on common action and consensus among the
main political forces and decision-makers as to the goals and instruments of European 
policy. The government puts an emphasis on realizing Polish interests, but wishes to
do it in the framework of a larger Polish vision of the EU development2.
According to Foreign Affairs Minister Rados³aw Sikorski, Poland has strongly
engaged itself in deepening the European integration and has become a stable and
reliable partner. The success of Polish foreign policy is now to be measured by its
effectiveness rather than by its ‘assertiveness’. In this vein, Poland managed to
react adequately to the Russian intervention in Georgia by pressing for an urgent EU 
reaction. The extraordinary European Council meeting in August 2008 was
convened at the initiative of Prime Minister Tusk3. Yet the much needed
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comprehensive vision of European integration and Poland’s role in the process is
still to be defined, hopefully in connection with the elaboration of the Polish
presidency’s priorities.
2. The impact of external factors
The economic crisis
The economic crisis has triggered protectionist tendencies around the globe, and most 
importantly within the EU. The reinforcement of such inclinations puts European
values and mechanisms of solidarity at risk. The Polish position is fully in line with
the ideas of the Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, which he expressed when he
addressed the European Parliament: ‘the current crisis is to a great extent a crisis of
trust, (...) if protectionism and mercantilism win, we will all lose (...) our strength and
our only chance for the future is to stand together’4. Also for Poland the only way to
tackle the crisis is to reinforce the cohesiveness and solidarity of EU actions. These
were the imperatives of the Polish strategy for the extraordinary European Council
summit on 1 March 2009. Upon the initiative of Prime Minister Tusk, an informal
meeting of CEE Member States with the Commission’s President was convened prior
to the EU-27 meeting in order to demonstrate full support of the New Member States
(NMS) for the single market rules and the Commission’s actions5. The cooperative
and coalition-based spirit together with the alliance with the Commission in the name
of European principles has clearly contributed to the new active and
pro-integrationist image of Poland. Poland will also be the largest beneficiary of
a 5 billion Euro stimulus package, most of which will be spent in the energy sector.
On the other hand, Poland and other CEE partners have not succeeded in softening the 
euro zone accession criteria.
The conflict between Russia and Georgia
From the Polish point of view, the conflict between Russia and Georgia made it clear
that thinking in terms of power politics, zones of influence and a zero sum game is
still very much alive in the vicinity of the EU. This kind of political thinking follows a 
completely different logic than the one underlying European integration6. The
conflict in the Caucasus also implies substantial destabilization potential in the
European neighbourhood. It reflects the doctrine of the existence of the regions of
Russia’s ‘privileged interests’. Russia expects Western states to recognize them in the 
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name of a ‘pragmatic’ approach deriving from the EU’s economic (energy) and
political (cooperation on combating terrorism) needs7. This also holds true for the gas
conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
The reaction of the EU to the Georgia crisis was criticised in Poland and elsewhere for 
its timidity and inadequacy. Nevertheless, the French presidency made a relatively
strong statement, stressing that the conflict has affected trust that is necessary for the
partnership between EU and Russia. The Commission was invited to carry out an
in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations, which would be taken into account in
negotiations of the new agreement8. As a result the talks have been suspended for
several months.
The gas crisis: the conflict between Russia and Ukraine
The 2009 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine follows an earlier crisis in 2006,
although the recent dispute has had more severe consequences for the gas supplies to
the EU and especially to the heavily dependent Central European states such as
Hungary or Slovakia. As a result, Russia is now seen in Europe as an indispensable,
but no longer fully reliable partner. At the same time, increasingly more attention is
being devoted to the consolidation of the intra-EU infrastructure in order to reduce
the dependence of individual Member States.
3. Goals and outcomes
The Lisbon Treaty
The government believes that both the deepening of cooperation within the EU and
the enlargement are in the interest of all Member States. The strengthening and
improvement of the institutional foundations of the EU are considered a top priority.
This refers above all to the reinforcement of the common foreign and security policy.
At the same time, the prime minister signed the Lisbon Treaty together with the
British Protocol, which had been negotiated by the former, more euro-sceptic
government. In Tusk’s perspective, this was the only way to guarantee the a smooth
ratification process, while taking into consideration the doubts of the President and
the main opposition party. For Poland one of the most important provisions of the new 
treaty regarding foreign policy was the clause on energy solidarity among EU
members.
The ratification crisis has to be regarded as a failure, both for Poland and the
European Union as a whole. It is worth stressing that the key Polish priority, namely
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the security of energy supplies, obtains the legal basis only with the Lisbon Treaty
(art. 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Other core areas, such as
enlargement and foreign and security policy, would also considerably benefit from
the new provisions. Poland is one of the few countries that has not completed the
ratification process of the treaty, as the president has decided to wait with his
signature for the final say of the Irish voters in the second referendum (scheduled for
October 2009). This can also be seen as a failure of the Polish authorities to reach
a domestic political consensus and present a clear pro-integration stance. The lack of
this ratification gives a very mixed message as to the Polish commitment to the
internal consolidation of the Union. Moreover, it is clear that Polish policy priorities
are impossible to achieve without the Lisbon Treaty.
The Polish Presidency in 2011
The government sees the upcoming presidency as a perfect and unique opportunity to
promote Poland both on a European level and globally. The challenge is to fully
exploit this opportunity. 
Presidency priorities, preliminarily outlined at this stage, concern notably the EU
Eastern dimension and the development of a common foreign and security policy.
Negotiations on the new budgetary perspective, further strengthening of the single
market and diversification of energy sources, are also on the agenda. Numerous
concrete preparatory actions have already been undertaken9: a) the appointment of
the Government Plenipotentiary for the Presidency (15.07.2008), b) the first
parliamentary debate on the state of preparations (06.11.2008), and c) the programme
of preparations adopted by the Council of Ministers (13.01.2009). The programming
of the presidency budget has entered its final phase. The first priorities will be defined 
in mid-2009 together with Denmark and Cyprus, other members of the presidency
trio. The government hopes to stimulate a debate on the priorities in the 2nd half of
2009. On a more detailed level, legislative planning will be done together with the
European Commission at the beginning of 2010. The government also wishes to
closely coordinate the three Central European Presidencies: Czech, Hungarian and
Polish, where the Eastern Partnership is supposed to play the major role. Regarding
organizational aspects, special working groups have been established and the training 
needs for each ministry have been identified. A special motivational scheme for
officials directly involved in the preparations has also been designed. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership
Poland has the ambition of shaping the EU Eastern dimension. In this context, the
future of Ukraine shall become a key element of the reformed ENP. Poland is
concerned with re-invigorating the ENP, in particular the Eastern dimension. Most
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importantly, the East is already considered to be the Polish spécialité de la maison by
Western partners, and Poland should focus on developing EU policy in this respect in
order to improve the political and social standards of the neighbours and to assist them
in reaching EU standards in the future10. The Polish government aims at encouraging
EU partners to use the conditionality principle effectively, while both stimulating
reforms and demanding substantial progress in the transformation process. 
Poland, together with Sweden, promoted the initiative of the Eastern Partnership
(EaP), which has been then transformed into a European project with the
communication of the Commission being published in early December 2008. Polish
competence in the Eastern agenda is appreciated by the EU partners. But so far Poland 
has not succeeded in persuading EU Member States to open a clear European
perspective for the Eastern partners, most importantly for Ukraine. This, however, is
a long-term goal, and reinforced cooperation within the Partnership might provide
additional arguments to Ukraine’s benefit over time. The Foreign Affairs Ministry
itself sees the Commission proposal very positively as a vast majority of Polish
preferences have been incorporated into the communication. Certain reservations
concern the lack of a special coordinator for the EaP within the Commission, as well
as the final funding proposal11.
It seems, however, that in terms of finances the Commission was relatively generous,
as some Member States, especially France, have already voiced concerns during the
February GAERC. The attempt to reduce funding for EaP partly derived from a fear
of shifting political attention away from the Mediterranean and partly from the
unwillingness to spend additional funds at the time of serious economic challenges
that the EU is facing due to the economic crisis. Moreover, ‘Member States have
noted that there were a number of issues, such as visa liberalization, articulation
between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy, participation of third
countries or the financing, which will require further discussion as part of the process
of developing and implementing the Eastern Partnership’12. Prior to the approval of
the EaP by the European Council in March, it seemed that the above-mentioned
reservations might significantly water down the previous diplomatic success of the
Polish government. However, the fact that the Council approved an additional 600
million Euros for the EaP means that the initiative will not remain a ‘paper tiger’.
Energy & Climate Change
Poland is profoundly concerned with European energy security being built on the
basis of the solidarity of the whole Union. Under no circumstances can it depend on
short-term interests of particular Member States or financial benefits deriving from
6 The European Policy of Donald Tusk’s Government
Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 8/93
10 Si ko r ski (2009), op. cit.
11 IPA in ter view with a high of fi cial from the Mi ni stry of Fo re ign Af fa irs, Wa r saw, 18 De ce m ber 2008.
12 Press Re le a se, 2926th Co un cil me e ting of GAERC, 23 Fe bru a ry 2009, p. 9.
political or economic egoism13. The Polish priorities are the following: a) no energy
enterprises will be funded by the EU as long as some of the Member States consider
them to be counterproductive to their efforts aiming at improving their energy
security, b) strong resistance of the Union against any pressures and blackmailing
from non-EU suppliers, c) diversification of sources and transit routes, and
d) creation of an intra-EU infrastructure allowing for the delivery of energy resources
to a Member State suffering from deficits due to external factors14.
With regard to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, Poland’s aim was to
prevent drastic increases in electricity prices due to the fact that 90% of electricity in
Poland is produced from coal. The new post-2013 emissions trading scheme would
have had a devastating effect on the Polish economy. The goal was to change the
Commission’s proposal accordingly. 
Success has been achieved at the European Council in December 2008 with regard to
the climate-energy package. Polish demands were largely incorporated into the final
compromise: costs both for Polish companies and households have been substantially 
reduced in comparison to the initial proposal of the Commission. Additional funds
have been acquired for the modernization of the Polish energy infrastructure until
2020. In this respect Central European cooperation has proven successful. The
countries where in 2006 at least 30% of the electricity was produced from one fossil
fuel and where the 2006 GDP per capita was less than 50% of the EU average will pay
for 100% of the carbon allowances only in 2020, instead of 2013. In addition, profits
from the trading scheme are be allocated for the modernization of energy sectors in
selected countries in a specific situation (such as Poland)15. 
Poland successfully achieved the reduction of costs in a medium-term perspective.
The recognition of the specificity of the Polish (or Central European) economy is
certainly a positive development. Moreover, the EU has finally recognized the
strength of Polish arguments concerning the energy security that had been voiced by 
subsequent Polish governments. Poland has been actively promoting an ambitious
EU approach to the security of energy resource supplies by lobbying for the energy
solidarity mechanism to be triggered as soon as 50% of the supplies for one Member 
State are being endangered, and not only when 20% of supplies for the EU are
endangered, which is currently the case. Such a change, in line with the Polish
position, was agreed upon at the March summit. Furthermore, The Council agreed
to use unspent money from the 2008 budget for funding energy infrastructure
projects, including the Nabucco pipeline, which would decrease the EU’s
dependence on Russian imports by bringing Caspian gas to a hub in Austria via the
Balkans.  
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Negotiation of the new agreement between the European Union
and Russia
Poland stopped blocking the start of the EU-Russia negotiations on the new
agreement as soon as its demands on lifting the Russian embargo were satisfied.
Additionally, the European Commission has accepted the notion of EU energy
solidarity as the guiding principle for these negotiations. The Polish government
believes that the EU-Russia summit in Samara (May 2007) contributed to the
realization of the fact that the consolidation and unity of the EU position would also
make Russia policy more constructive. Poland’s goal is to avoid any situation where
Russia would be able to play on the differences between EU Member States. 
An agreement has been reached with European partners on the contents of the
mandate for negotiations with Russia. It responds to Poland’s concerns in the area of
energy security. The Polish government withdrew its veto of the negotiation mandate
which allowed for influencing the policy of the whole Union towards Russia. 
Most of the EU Member States have modified their attitude towards Russia in recent
years. This, however, is less due to Polish persuasion efforts, but more to the Russian
behaviour both in international and domestic politics. Among the most important
factors one can find: a) the repeatedly threatened energy security of the Western
countries (2006, 2009), b) the policy towards a shared neighbourhood (conflicts with
Georgia and Ukraine), and c) the persecution of the democratic opposition and
neglect for basic democratic standards and values16. 
The negotiations were suspended following the Georgia conflict and resumed in
November 2008 despite the opposition from Lithuania. Poland supported the
suspension of the talks to maintain European unity on this issue, although it was
convinced that Russia had failed to fulfil the conditions of the ceasefire agreement
negotiated by President Sarkozy in August last year. Little progress has been made in
the negotiations ever since, even though the Czech presidency hoped however for the
real developments to take place during its term until June 200917. 
EU Enlargement
The priority with regard to enlargement policy is the future membership of Ukraine
and the creation of a political consensus around this issue within the EU itself.
Poland is constantly insisting on the fact that any European state respecting
democratic principles can apply to join the EU18. Poland strongly supports the
integration of Ukraine with the Western international institutions. On the other hand,
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Poland does not seem to be particularly active as far as the current enlargement
process is concerned. The Western Balkans constitute a priority for the former
Slovenian, current Czech and future Hungarian presidencies. In fact, it can be argued
that Poland, a traditionally pro-enlargement Member State, is not sufficiently
working on promoting the Turkish agenda. 
European security and post-conflict management
From the government’s point of view, it is essential to engage in peace-keeping and
humanitarian missions led by the EU. Poland is convinced that the EU should become 
more active in the security area, both regionally and beyond Europe. At the same
time, the EU should always complement and not double NATO activities. Within the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Poland aims at focusing its attention on crisis
management, humanitarian intervention and the European Defence Agency. The
Polish government is also active in the discussions on the revision of the European
Security Strategy. 
Poland has taken an active part in EU military operations, with the aim of contributing 
to global security. For example, 170 soldiers have been deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (out of a total of 2500 troops from EU Member States). In 2006, 130
members of gendarmerie participated in the EUFOR RD Congo operation, forming
the fourth largest Member State contingent. The presence is also assured in the
EUFOR Chad/RCA operation (350 soldiers). Poland is also responsible for the
preparation and functioning of a Battlefield Group (in the framework of the Rapid
Response Concept) that consists of German, Slovak, Latvian and Lithuanian troops
and is supposed to be fully deployable in the first half of 201019. 
Poland is increasingly active when it comes to reinforcing EU military capabilities.
A Polish officer, General Adam Sowa, has been appointed Deputy Chief Executive
for Operations in the European Defence Agency. Poland is also among eleven
Member States who are participating in the 2nd R&T Joint Investment Programme
(ICET – Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies, established in May 2008), 
while remaining one of its largest contributors20. 
The European Security Strategy (ESS), conceived in 2003, did not really integrate the
security concerns and ideas of the then incoming EU members from Central Europe.
In Poland it was often perceived as being designed for the ‘old’ EU only21. In this
perspective, the renewed ESS presented in December 2008 incorporated Polish
preferences into the EU strategic thinking on security to a significant extent. Increased
concerns about energy dependence are acknowledged and the latter is considered
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a serious security threat. Greater diversification of sources of supplies and transit routes is 
deemed essential22. The potential of the Eastern Partnership, as well as the Union for
the Mediterranean, together with close cooperation with Ukraine and Turkey are
underlined in this respect. It has been pointed out that EU-Russia relations have
deteriorated over the conflict in Georgia23. The idea of the French and Russian
presidents ‘re-designing’ Europe’s security architecture by drawing in Russia has found
little support24. However, the text also reflects the division of perspectives on Russia
and it fails to mention the fact that EU observers have not been not allowed into South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Moscow has recognized as independent states. 
With regard to most recent security and development challenges in the Eastern
neighbourhood, Poland has delivered the 3rd largest contingent (30 participants) to
the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), an independent civilian observer mission to
Georgia deployed under European security and defence policy on 1 October 200825. 
An international Donors Conference was organized by European Commission and the
World Bank (22 October 2008) in order to ‘mobilize a critical mass of external
assistance to support the country in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure,
reintegration of internally displaced people and in accelerating Georgia’s recovery
from the impact of the August 2008 conflict on its economy’26. The European
Community pledged over 480 million Euros for the period 2008–2010, with additional
contributions from the vast majority of Member States accounting for over 130 million
Euros (however, the USA declared almost 760 and Japan over 150 million Euros). The
largest EU donors were Sweden and Germany (40 and 33 million Euro respectively).
Poland pledged only 3.3 million Euros, which is quite surprising in the light of its
political support for Georgia and its general commitment to the Eastern agenda27. 
Conclusions
The re-orientation of Polish European policy towards a more active,pro-integrationist, constructive and coalition-based approach has becomea reality. The main elements of the political strategy for the Polish role in EU
foreign affairs, such as the eastern policy, openness towards enlargement, energy
security, ESDP development, European solidarity and close cooperation with
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Germany, Central Europe and Scandinavian countries, are in place. However, certain
ambiguities, like the Lisbon Treaty ratification, do not help communicate the Polish
vision of integration to EU partners.
On the particular aspects of the European foreign policy the following elements
should be stressed:
n ENP and Eastern Partnership: Poland managed to push through a reasonable, yet
ambitious proposal on the table and to obtain preliminary approval of the European
Council and 600 million Euros have been earmarked as additional funding for this
initiative. Constant communication efforts have to be directed at our partners in order
to explain that we are dealing with European neighbours of the EU in the East, but
only with neighbours of Europe in the south. 
n Energy and Climate Change: Poland contributed to the EU’s changing perception
about the seriousness of energy challenges and resulted in the incorporation of
security and diversification into the ‘Western-oriented’ climate change agenda.
Major success has been achieved in relation to the post-2010 emissions trading
scheme. However, much depends on domestic policy making and the willingness of
EU partners to finance the modernization of CEECs’ energy infrastructure. The latter
becomes highly problematic at the time of recession and increased focus on a purely
national approach to problem-solving. However, taking into account the amount of
time and funds necessary for energy investments, the transition period until 2020 is
not a particularly long one. Poland has achieved diplomatic success, but it now has to
be translated into immediate domestic political and legislative actions. Also,
significant questions remain on the funding of the so-called Ekofund aimed to finance 
CC2 reduction investments in poor countries of Africa and Asia, which could be
potentially very expensive for Poland.
n Relations with Russia: The Commission has recognized the importance of energy
security concerns for negotiating a mandate with Russia. Poland is no longer blocking 
the new partnership talks with Russia, although negotiations have been practically
frozen in the aftermath of the Georgian and gas crises.
n Enlargement: Poland is very much focused on the European perspective of Ukraine.
However, we are not taking the opportunity to become an active supporter of the
Turkish membership. The upcoming trio presidency provides a perfect opportunity to
work on the Cyprus problem with the Republic of Cyprus. A coherent approach and
leadership on the enlargement agenda are missing in Polish European policy.
n European security: Poland is an increasingly active player with regard to military
missions and military capabilities. Certain changes in the renewed ESS reflect at least 
partial Polish success in introducing to the document the notion of energy security, as
well as a slightly more assertive approach towards Russia. However, concrete
involvement in post-conflict Georgia, especially in financial terms, has not yet been
realized.
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n Lisbon Treaty: a very unclear message from Poland constitutes one of its major
weaknesses in European politics. In this context, domestic political conflicts
negatively affect Polish weight and influence in the EU.
n Presidency: the debate on Presidency priorities planned for the 2nd half of 2009
could provide for an important turning point with regard to foreign policy-making in
Poland, which tends to be a relatively closed and secretive process. This will happen
as long as the opinions of civil society organisations, business and academia are
actively searched for and duly taken into consideration.
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